ji·had·ica

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 3: Striking the Enemy at the Center of Gravity

Continuing… It is no accident that the World Trade Center was the main object of the 9/11 attacks since it was the symbol of U.S. economic hegemony. Bear in mind that the attacks had been planned in the ’90s during the height of U.S. economic power. The strikes were meant to polarize Muslims as well as the enemy’s population. They were also intended to push the U.S. into overreacting and committing errors. Why didn’t all four strikes on 9/11 hit the Pentagon alone? Why did al-Qaeda attack civilians and the WTC? We need a new strategic framework to understand its reasoning. Three things needs to be considered. First, when the U.S. attacks a country, it abides by the principle of the ends justify the means. This is one of the foundational principles of American pragmatism. Studies that came out after 9/11 really brought this mindset to the fore. But, according

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Will McCants September 14, 2008

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 2: Provoking the Tyrant of the Sea & Air

Continuing: The main strategic question of the ’80s was how to mobilize Muslim youth to fight the Soviet incursion into the Islamic world while local conflicts were distracting the youths’ attention. After the fall of the USSR the question became, why provoke the sole remaining superpower?  Is the US comparable to the USSR?  After all, the latter was attacked in Afghanistan at the nadir of its power. Even more sensitive questions have been raised, like what was the Sharia basis for defying the Taliban emirate and suddenly attacking the US?  Was it worth ignoring the interests of the Taliban for the sake of a frivolous war?  Did Palestinians benefit from 9/11 when Sharon exploited it as a pretext to use excessive force in the Palestinian territories?  Did it help Iraqis? The most troubling question has been: was the strike an attempt to escape the jihad’s setbacks that came in Egypt,

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Will McCants September 10, 2008

The Strategic Effects of 9/11, Part 1: America & the World Before the Strike

To continue the series, here’s my summary of part 1 of Abu al-Fadl’s study: American strategy experts overlook the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan as the decisive event that ended the Cold War. Instead, they focus on the USSR’s and Eastern Europe’s attraction to Western culture. The myth promulgated by these experts is that soft power defeated the USSR without firing a single bullet. This is the myth of Western values that produce miracles. This myth doesn’t explain the reason for putting nukes in Europe for half a century; the star wars program under Reagan; Brzezinski’s ingenious idea to destroy the USSR from the inside by breathing life into oppressed Islamic peoples; or why Reagan praised Afghan militants as freedom fighters. As one of the preeminent neo-realists in American foreign policy, Stephen Walt, said, the Soviet withdrawal from the arena of conflict in the ’80s left the U.S. in a position

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Will McCants September 8, 2008

The Strategic Effects of 9/11: Introduction

In commemoration of the seventh anniversary of 9/11, Faloja member Abu al-Fadl Madi has been serially posting chapters of his new study, “The Strategic Effects of the Raid on New York and Washington.” He started posting in early August and it looks like he will finish on or around 9/11.  Abu al-Fadl’s study looks interesting, so I’ll be summarizing it throughout the week. In early July, Abu al-Fadl announced his series as follows: Since the seventh anniversary of September 11 is rapidly approaching amid the dust rising from battles on many fronts, especially in Afghanistan, the graveyard of invaders, I propose to begin studying the strategic landscape that followed the events of September 11, as well as the possibilities and prospects to which the attacks gave rise, to say nothing of its effects. The following is a summary of the introduction he posted in early August: American strategists don’t agree

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Will McCants September 7, 2008

Cold vs. Hot Terrorism

Hesbah pundit `Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir has been writing a series of essays he collectively calls “Real War vs. Symbolic War.” The point of the essays is to explain the difference between terrorist attacks (symbolic war) and other types of military violence (real war). One of his essays, “Cold Terrorism,” examines the decision-making of groups choosing between killing for the sake of eliminating enemies without drawing attention to themselves (cold terrorism) vs. killing to provoke a response against themselves (hot terrorism). The following quotes are from a recent English translation: * Can we afford not to take the responsibility of the operation? * Does the safety of the performers take precedence over the attack or otherwise? * The ease of performing the operation and the available means * Are we ready to tackle the retaliation of the enemy or not? If the aim is to get rid of the enemy without

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Will McCants September 4, 2008

Assad al-Jihad2 Remarks on the State of al-Qaida

[Scott Sanford]  On 23 August 2008, Ekhlaas member Assad al-Jihad2 (أسد الجهاد2), or the Lion of Jihad 2, posted a statement concerning the state of al-Qaida in the world today. He started the statement with a 13 December 2001 news report about the battle in Tora Bora and how it seemed that al-Qaida was on the brink of total destruction. However, he argued, “In only seven years…they [al-Qaida] were able to…triumph over the world alliance against them.” He based this assertion on several events he attributed to al-Qaida: Many United States government officials were forced to leave their posts after their failure to defeat al-Qaida American historians have claimed that President Bush has been the worst president in American history Al-Qaida weakened the most powerful country on Earth in “the Badr of the [21st] century” (This is a reference to the 624CE Battle of Badr where approximately 300 Muslim soldiers

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Will McCants August 26, 2008

Sahab Releases Full Zawahiri Message in English

A few days ago, ARY (a Pakistani network) ran an extremely truncated version of a lengthy audio tape of Zawahiri addressing Pakistanis in English.  Yesterday, Sahab (the media production arm of al-Qaeda) released the full audio recording online (open the .pdf below for links).  Here are the interesting bits: Zawahiri says at the beginning that he wants to address Pakistanis in Urdu, but he can’t speak the language.  He is speaking English to communicate with them, even though it is the language of the enemy. Zawahiri’s attachment to Pakistan began in his childhood.  His grandfather was the first to translate the poetry of Muhammad Iqbal into Arabic. Musharraf is a tool of the U.S. Pakistan made a “strategic blunder’ when it allowed the U.S. to install Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan since Karzai is friendly to India.  Now, Pakistan has no “strategic depth” in the mountains of Afghanistan, which would be

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Will McCants August 17, 2008

New Issues of Two Jihadi Journals

Issue 28 of Sada al-Jihad is out.  Articles include, “Hamas Responds Negatively to the Invitation of Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri” and “The Intellectual Pollution of the Followers of the Salafi-Jihadi Method.” A new journal, Qadaya Jihadiyya (Jihadi Issues), has also be released.  The production quality is better than most of the Jihadi journals and the articles look interesting.  There is a “Strategic Issues” section, reminding me of Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi’s column in the Ansar journal.  It has two articles: “The Islamic State of Iraq and Early Signs of American Failure” and “Regional Alliances and the Path of Jihad.”  Another section, “Thoughts of a Mujahid,” has the memoir of someone who attended the al-Faruq training camp. Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-faloja-issue-28-of-sada-al-jihad Document (Arabic): 8-12-08-faloja-issue-1-of-qadaya-jihadiyya

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Will McCants August 14, 2008

Jihadi Explains Iranian Realpolitik

Abu `Abd al-Rahman `Atiyyat Allah (possibly this person) has written a new booklet titled Ru’ya kashifa in which he tries to convince his Jihadi brethren that Iran and Hezbollah are not working with the U.S. and Israel as part of a grand conspiracy to subjugate Sunnis. Rather, he argues, Iran and its cat’s paw Hezbollah are seeking hegemony in the region. Achieving it means supporting popular Muslim causes and making temporary alliances with ideological enemies or competitors. Below is a summary: It is hard to analyze Shia states and groups because of their doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya), or concealing one’s true beliefs. p.4 Dissimulation is permitted in Sunni Islam if you are in danger. But the Shia make a habit of it. p.5 Outwardly Iran and Shia groups stress Sunni-Shia unity; embrace causes that are important to Muslims, particularly the Palestinian issue; and put Iran forward as the only authentic

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Will McCants August 6, 2008

Prophetic Precedents for Various Types of Warfare

This one is for all those who believe that Jihadis act strictly according to the Qur’an and the Sunna.  It’s a detailed study by Abu al-Harith al-Ansari of the various types of warfare and the prophetic precedents for each.  There are 41 kinds in all, including “media warfare,” “economic warfare,” “secret warfare,” “war of attrition,” and so forth.  If you’ve ever needed to make the argument that Islamic scripture determines Jihadi behavior, this 278-page book is for you. Of course, you’d still have a hard time explaining why a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq recently broke with the organization and renounced suicide attacks. abu-al-harith-al-ansari-irshad-al-saul-ila-hurub-al-rasul إرشاد السؤول إلى حروب الرسول

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Will McCants August 5, 2008
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