As I’ve said in the two previous installments, how you define and scope CVE will affect program design and implementation. The most important questions to ask are: Which population along the spectrum is the focus of the program? Who is best suited to implement the program? What laws and human rights principles come into play? How do you know if you’re succeeding? For each point along the spectrum, there is a variety of programs that might work. Here’s just a sample: Disseminating derogatory information about a terrorist group and its actions Interventions by law enforcement or respected community leaders Counseling and mentoring Change Yourself: adventure programs, leadership development Change the World: non-violent political activism, volunteerism Some will work better for one part of the spectrum than another. Some might work across the board. The exact nature of the program is not nearly as important as finding a satisfactory answer to this question:

Yesterday, Mary Habeck posted a net assessment of al-Qaeda’s fortunes. After I said something uncharitable about it on Twitter, Mary was understandably annoyed. In the spirit of fairness, I will give her argument a full airing here and respond. Mary first states the facts that she believes most AQ experts agree on: “al Qaeda is primarily the small “core” located somewhere in Afghanistan-Pakistan” “the affiliates have an ambiguous relationship with this core and are generally focused on local concerns” “the objective of the core is to attack the U.S. and its allies” “because of our excellent counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, we have thwarted all such attempts on the U.S. since 9-11” Like Mary, I do not subscribe to 1, 2 and 3 and I know many other AQ experts, inside and outside government, who don’t as well. Al-Qaeda is the small group in Af-Pak and its affiliates who have pledged an

Those of us who parse Islamist and Jihadi-Salafi texts “like Talmudic scholars poring over a manuscript” are familiar with Joas’ meticulous work on Maqdisi and others of his ilk. But since I’ve never seen Joas invited to give a single talk in this part of the world, I have the feeling that his work has not gotten the full airing it deserves outside the academy. So over Joas’ protests (sorry brah!), here’s a quick rundown of what he’s been up to since 2009: “Legitimizing Pragmatism: Hamas’ Framing Efforts from Militancy to Moderation and Back?” Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, no. 3 (2010): 358-378 (article on Hamas’ efforts to legitimize its changing policies vis-à-vis Israel over the years while staying true to their original rhetoric) “Protecting Jihad: The Sharia Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad,” Middle East Policy, 18, no. 2 (2011): 148-162 (explains the rise of the now well-known Shari’a Council of

In my previous post, I proposed a minimal definition of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) as reducing the number of terrorist group supporters through non-coercive means. I also suggested that the spectrum of support ranges from those who are vulnerable to becoming supporters to those who are engaged in criminal activity. There are pros and cons associated with intervening in each group. The three groups at the far right of the spectrum are the easiest to identify because they have either consistently voiced their support for a terrorist organization or taken action on its behalf. Although they are extremely difficult to dissuade, focusing on them risks less blow back from the broader communities of which they are a part. There is also less risk of straying into the policing of thought crimes. Conversely, the two other groups, “vulnerable” and “radicalizing,” are theoretically easier to dissuade than the others but they are

At Jihadica, we usually don’t weigh in on policy debates. I’m reluctant to break that tradition but I have a few thoughts on countering violent extremism that I’d like to workshop with Jihadica readers before turning them into something more. The United States and its allies devote considerable financial and human resources to countering violent extremism (CVE). Nevertheless the definition of CVE is unclear, ranging from fighting bad guys to creating good guys. This lack of precision makes it hard to design, execute, and evaluate CVE programs and makes it easy to slap the CVE label on all manner of initiatives, including many that seem to have little to do with stopping terrorism and might otherwise be cut by Congress. The lack of precision also inhibits thinking about whether the CVE enterprise is worthwhile and what should constitute it. In the interest of clarifying the activities covered by CVE and

As you can see, Jihadica is going through a redesign. I’m going to be tweaking the features too. If there’s something you’d like to see added, please drop us a note in the comments section.

There are going to be loads of conferences this September looking back on 9/11.  This is the one I plan to attend: “10 Years Later: Insights on al-Qaeda’s Past and Future through Captured Records” sponsored by the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) at the National Defense University on Sept. 13-14.  The CRRC has picked up where West Point’s CTC left off and is the US government’s primary conduit for releasing loads of material from the Harmony Database, which houses scans and translations of documents captured in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Over the last decade, these documents have yielded much of what we know about al-Qaeda’s inner workings, and they continue to be a treasure trove of fresh finds for grad students and scholars alike. The CRRC is taking proposals for papers now (deadline June 15) and they want drafts by August 15 (email Joseph Simons here).  I hope Anzalone, Zelin, Farrall,

Two years, an underwear bomber, an Arab Spring, a new war, and many memos later, I’ve returned to the private sector and blogging.  At the Department of Defense I tried to find ways to persuade academics to write about terrorism.  At the Department of State, I tried to find ways to persuade angry youth not to give academics something to write about. In all of that, I benefited greatly from the work here and around the blogosphere.  The proliferation of sites that dispassionately study Islamist militancy has been heartening, if not the increase of the subject’s importance.  Ibn Siqilli’s and Aaron’s blogs are particularly valuable new resources and Clint’s is a refreshing change of pace.  As for my old standbys, they have only gotten better (I’m looking at you Aaron, Leah, Marc, and Ex).  Now if I can figure out this twitter thingamajigger, I can hang out with the cool kids again.