ji·had·ica

Anti-Shia Graffiti In Gaza

A member of the Faloja Forum, Abu Muhammad al-Rafhawi, has posted pictures of anti-Shia graffiti from Gaza that he claims was written by youth in the Qassam Brigades and the internal security forces.  I don’t know if this sort of graffiti is typical or if it reflects rising hostility toward Hezbollah and Iran among younger Hamas members, but it’s interesting nonetheless. Document (Arabic): 10-24-08-faloja-anti-shia-graffiti-in-gaza

Read More »

Influence of Jihadi Forums

Rob at Arabic Media Shack has, as always, an informed take on the forum closures.  I have a slightly different take that I’ll share after a summary of his argument. Rob concedes that the closures are a big deal (doesn’t say why), but he’s skeptical that they are influential in the Middle East for the following reasons: Access:   There is not much internet access in the ME compared to the West.  Also, local censors can easily block the forums. Interest:  Most Middle Easterners don’t think that much about Bin Laden or al-Qaeda. Coverage:  If the forums were important, mainstream Arabic newspapers would have written more about them. Rob ends his post by suggesting that influence should be measured by how many people in the region actually watch or read al-Qaeda material. On the issue of access, Rob is right: connectivity in the Middle East is much less than in

Read More »

The Strategic Effects of 9/11: Introduction

In commemoration of the seventh anniversary of 9/11, Faloja member Abu al-Fadl Madi has been serially posting chapters of his new study, “The Strategic Effects of the Raid on New York and Washington.” He started posting in early August and it looks like he will finish on or around 9/11.  Abu al-Fadl’s study looks interesting, so I’ll be summarizing it throughout the week. In early July, Abu al-Fadl announced his series as follows: Since the seventh anniversary of September 11 is rapidly approaching amid the dust rising from battles on many fronts, especially in Afghanistan, the graveyard of invaders, I propose to begin studying the strategic landscape that followed the events of September 11, as well as the possibilities and prospects to which the attacks gave rise, to say nothing of its effects. The following is a summary of the introduction he posted in early August: American strategists don’t agree

Read More »

Iraq a Sinking Ship for al-Qaeda, Afghanistan the Lifeboat

Earlier this week, I noted that members of the Hesbah forum are increasingly pessimistic about Iraq. And in May I wrote about the death of Sulayman al-`Utaybi, an al-Qaeda leader in Iraq who had left for Afghanistan after his dismissal from his post. Here’s what I wrote at the time: That he headed straight for Afghanistan makes me wonder if this is a sign of things to come as AQ gets squeezed out of Iraq. Now the Washington Post gives us further evidence that Iraq is a sinking ship for al-Qaeda and Afghanistan is the lifeboat, at least for the senior leadership. Amit Paley has written a well-sourced article on the departure of Abu Ayyub al-Masri (aka Abu Hamza al-Muhajer), the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, for Afghanistan. Here’s what we learn from the article (sources in parentheses): Foreign fighters AQ is diverting new recruits to Afghanistan and Iraq. (U.S.

Read More »

Jihadis Despair of Iraq

Yaman Mukhaddab, a popular contributor to al-Hesbah (the most exclusive Jihadi forum), wrote an essay on July 21 in which he expressed alarm at the low morale and pessimism of some of his fellow forum members on account of al-Qaeda setbacks in Iraq. One brother, he notes, said that the jihad in Iraq is ending like the jihad in Algeria (badly). Another brother criticized Mukhaddab for being optimistic about Iraq. A third said the situation is out of control and the outcome is already known. Mukhaddab responds that such pessimism is unwarranted.  As scripture says, victory will come after severe testing.  And things can turn around at any time.  If AQ is able to strike the U.S. or if the U.S. strikes Iran, the mujahids in Iraq will benefit greatly (he doesn’t explain why). Mukhaddab ends by reminding his readers that there was a similar level of despondency after the

Read More »

Must-Read Blog on IRGC

Given all of the hullabaloo surrounding Iran’s weapons testing, it’s a good time to announce a new blog on the IRGC and Iranian politics by a close friend of mine, who shall remain nameless for the time being.  The blogger is one of America’s few, true experts on the IRGC and his site is an extremely welcome addition to the blogesphere. I’ll be offline for a few days, but should be back in business early next week.

Read More »

Walking the Talk: Forum Members Travel to Afghanistan and Iraq (Pt. 3)

Today we continue our look at a Kuwaiti cell and how its members transitioned from forum fighters to foreign fighters. When we left off, Badr al-Harbi and Bawasil had returned to Kuwait from the front in Afghanistan via Iran, entrusted with a special mission by Abu al-Layth al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda leader. They were delayed in carrying out their task by Iranian, and then Kuwaiti, security forces. The latter, according to al-Furqan al-Junubi’s account, had tortured them and confiscated their passports. After being released, Harbi and Bawasil stayed in Kuwait a full year to complete their special mission: gathering money, clothes, and food for the Jihadis in Afghanistan. In this, they relied on their network of friends, many of whom were already committed to the cause. Yet Harbi and Bawasil’s efforts aroused the suspicions of other Jihadis, who wrote the brothers in Afghanistan and told them that they were spies.

Read More »

Walking the Talk: Forum Members Travel to Afghanistan and Iraq (Pt. 2)

On Monday, we looked at the case of al-Miskin al-Muhajir/asdasd99, who finally made his way to Afghanistan. Miskin had hoped to go to Iraq in April with a group from Kuwait, but unnamed obstacles stood in his way. We don’t yet know the fate of Miskin, but we do know what happened to this earlier group. The story begins with Abu `Umar Badr al-Harbi, 36, from Kuwait. According to a friend of his, al-Furqan al-Junubi, Harbi was the oldest of his brothers and very close to his mother. He became “committed to the path (of jihad)” at the age of 14. During his military service in Kuwait, Harbi met his best friend, al-Bawasil. Bawasil was at the beginning of his commitment to jihad when 9/11 happened. Both men rejoiced at the attack and were impressed that someone had been able to strike so deep inside the U.S. One day, Harbi

Read More »

Fatah al-Islam Leader Threatens Hezbollah, U.S.-Friendly Sunnis

Shakir al-`Absi, the fugitive leader of Fatah al-Islam, has issued his second audio statement since the defeat of his organization at the hands of the Lebanese Army last year. In it, he claims that the U.S. knows that it cannot directly break the “power” (shawka–a favorite Jihadi term) of the Sunnis in the Middle East, so it is using proxies to achieve the same result. This is particularly the case in Lebanon. Firstly, the U.S. is working through Sunni proxies to take control of the state’s material and media resources. Secondly, it is deliberately empowering Iran and its rejectionist allies in the region. (“Rejectionists” is a pejorative term used for Twelver Shia, who reject the first three caliphs). `Absi goes on to say that the Sunnis of Lebanon have no one to fight for them. Hezbollah is not serious about fighting Jews; they just want control of Lebanon. And the

Read More »

Bin Laden Statement Prompts Speculation on AQ Strategy in Palestine (Part 3)

In the final installment of the series, we’ll look at a piece of analysis from Ekhlaas member Abu Hamza 2005 titled, “A Modest Reading of al-Qaeda’s Strategy in the Levant [bilad al-sham]”. Abu Hamza begins by referring to Bin Laden’s 2007 statement, “To Our People in Iraq.” The statement, according to Abu Hamza, indicates that the Islamic State of Iraq is the nucleus of a future caliphate, but the caliphate will not be realized until the countries surrounding Iraq are defeated and Israel is destroyed. For this reason, Al-Qaeda “the Mother” (i.e. al-Qaeda Central) is very keen on expanding into the Levant and the other countries surrounding Israel. It also wants to establish branches in important global capitals, which can put pressure on foreign countries and scatter the focus of the enemy. Abu Hamza says that he is certain that AQ cells are being created in the Palestinian territories, Syria,

Read More »
Latest Jihadica
Subscribe